The existence of incentive-compatible, computationallyefficient mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with good approximation ratios is the paradigmatic problem in algorithmic mechanism design. It is believed that, in many cases, good approximations for combinatorial auctions may be unattainable due to an inherent clash between truthfulness and computational efficiency. In this paper, we prove the first computational-complexity inapproximability results for incentive-compatible mechanisms for combinatorial auctions. Our results are tight, hold for the important class of VCG-based mechanisms, and are based on the complexity assumption that NP has no polynomial-size circuits. We show two different techniques to obtain such lower bounds: one for deter- *
Introduction
In a combinatorial auction, a set of items is sold to bidders with private preferences over subsets of the items, with the intent of maximizing the social welfare (i.e., the sum of bidders' values for their allocated items). Manifesting the tension between bounded computational resources and strategic interaction between selfish participants, combinatorial auctions gained the status of being the paradigmatic problem in algorithmic mechanism design [31] .
From a computational perspective, the general problem is NP-hard, and cannot be approximated within a constant factor [9] . From a strategic perspective, as agents' preferences are private, they may report false information in an attempt to manipulate the outcome. From a strictly computational perspective, extensive work in past years identified a rich class of instances that allow for positive computational results. While still NP-hard, the assumption that bidders' preferences are complement-free (the value for bundles does not exceed the sum of their components) allows for constant-factor approximations (see [9] for a survey). These approximations, however, assume agents reveal their true preferences. From a purely strategic perspective, the famous VCG mechanism can ensure bidders are incentivized to reveal their true preferences in this setting. This however, is under the assumption that one has unlimited computational resources, as the VCG mechanism requires the allocation problem to be solved optimallyan NP-hard task in our case.
At the heart of algorithmic mechanism design is the quest for auction protocols that are both incentivecompatible and computationally efficient, and guarantee decent approximation ratios. Sadly, to date, huge gaps exist between the state of the art approximation ratios obtained by unrestricted, and by truthful, algorithms.
It is believed that this could be due to an inherent clash between the truthfulness and computational-efficiency requirements, that manifests itself in greatly degraded algorithm performance. For the first time, such tension between the two desiderata was recently shown to exist in [34] for a different mechanism design problem called combinatorial public projects [38] . However, in the context of combinatorial auctions, due to their unique combinatorial structure, the algorithmic game theory community currently lacks the machinery to prove this [36] .
The celebrated class of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms [40, 11, 23] is the only known universal technique for the design of deterministic incentive-compatible mechanisms. (In certain interesting cases VCG mechanisms are the only truthful mechanisms [8, 20, 26, 35, 34] .) While a naïve application of VCG is often computationally intractable, more clever uses of VCG are the key to the best known (deterministic) approximation ratios for combinatorial auctions [17, 24] . For these reasons, the exploration of the computational limitations of such mechanisms is an important research agenda (pursued in [16, 20, 26, 30, 34] ). Recently, it was shown [34] that the computational complexity of VCG-based mechanisms is closely related to the notion of VC dimension. Using existing VC machinery, [34] was able to prove computational hardness results for combinatorial public projects. However, for combinatorial auctions, these techniques are no longer applicable. This is because, unlike combinatorial public projects, the space of outcomes in combinatorial auctions does not consist of subsets of the universe of items, but rather of partitions of this universe (between the bidders). This calls for the different VC machinery approaches for the handling of such problems.
Results
In this paper, we show the first computational complexity lower bounds for VCG-based mechanisms, and truthful mechanisms in general, for combinatorial auctions (with the possible exception of a result in [26] for a related auction environment). First, we show this for deterministic maximal-in-range mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with budget-additive bidders. The class of budget-additive valuations, defined formally in Sec. 3, is strictly contained in the class of submodular valuations, which in turn is strictly contained in the class of complement-free valuations. Our inapproximability results depend on the computational assumption that SAT does not have polynomial-size circuits. Theorem 1.1. Let M be a VCG-based mechanism in a combinatorial auctions with m items and n budgetadditive bidders, where n = n(m) ≤ m η , for any positive constant η < 1/2. Then, M cannot approximate the social welfare within a factor better than n/(1+ǫ) unless N P ⊆ P/poly.
This result is tight, as [17] show a VCG-based upper bound of √ m, and a VCG-based upper bound of n is trivial.
Next, we extend our lower bound to a class of strictly more powerful randomized mechanisms. This class includes all universally-truthful VCG-based mechanisms, and more importantly a strictly more powerful class of truthful-in-expectation mechanismswhich we term maximal-in-weighted-range (MIWR). It also includes every randomized mechanism that is a probability distributions over MIWR mechanisms; we call such mechanisms randomized maximal-in-weightedrange. Our result applies to any class of valuations satisfying natural closure properties -we term such valuation classes regular -and moreover rendering the algorithmic problem of two-bidder combinatorial auctions APX-hard. Such valuation classes include submodular, complement-free, superadditive, and coverage valuations, but not budget-additive valuations. The extension to randomized mechanisms comes at a cost, however: we show an optimal lower bound only in terms of the number of players. Nevertheless, as an easy corollary this result rules out a constant-factor approximation using randomized maximal-in-weighted-range mechanisms. Theorem 1.2. Fix a regular valuation class C for which 2-player social welfare maximization is AP Xhard. Fix a constant n ≥ 1. For any constant ǫ > 0, no polynomial-time randomized MIWR algorithm for nplayer combinatorial auctions achieves an approximation ratio of n − ǫ, unless NP ⊆ P/Poly.
Techniques
Informally, our method of lower bounding the approximability of deterministic VCGbased mechanisms via VC arguments is the following: We consider well-known auction environments for which exact optimization is NP-hard. We show that if a VCGbased mechanism approximates closely the optimal social welfare, then it is implicitly solving optimally a smaller, but still relatively large, optimization problem of the same nature -an NP-hard feat. We establish this by showing that the subset of outcomes (partitions of items) considered by the VCG-based mechanism is "large", and hence must "shatter" a relatively large subset of the items.
For the extension to randomized MIWR mechanisms, an additional idea is needed: rather than directly converting an r-approximate mechanism into an exact optimization algorithm for a smaller problem, we instead convert an (r + δ)-approximate MIWR algorithm into an (r − δ)-approximate MIWR algorithm over a smaller set of items. When the problem is APXhard, we then reach a contradiction by taking α to be the infimum of the approximation ratios achievable by polynomial-time MIWR mechanisms. Translating this idea into a rigorous proof requires a delicate induction over the number of players, as well as the careful handling of some complexity-theoretic difficulties.
For both results, dealing with partitions of items rather than subsets of items, as is traditional in VCdimension machinery, poses a number of difficulties. For one, extending the Sauer-Shelah lemma to partitions requires carefully defining of what it means for a range to be "large": a lower-bound on the cardinality no longer suffices for a useful shattering result. Moreover, dealing with partitions requires that we handle the possibility of unallocated items. We overcome these difficulties by exhibiting counting arguments that show that, for any mechanism that obtains a non-trivial approximation ratio, there must be a reasonably large subset of items that are fully allocated in exponentially many different ways. This "shattering" of the allocation space allows us to establish our lower bounds.
Related Work
Combinatorial auctions have been extensively studied in both the economics and the computer science literature [9, 12, 13] . It is known that if the preferences of the bidders are unrestricted then no constant approximation ratios are achievable (in polynomial time) [28, 33] . Hence, much research has been devoted to the exploration of restrictions on bidders' preferences that allow for good approximations, e.g., for complement-free (subadditive), and submodular, preferences constant approximation ratios have been obtained [17, 19, 21, 22, 27, 41] . In contrast, the known truthful approximation algorithms for these classes have non-constant approximation ratios [14, 17, 18] . It is believed that this gap may be due to the computational burden imposed by the truthfulness requirement. However, to date, this belief remains unproven. In particular, no computational complexity lower bounds for truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions are known.
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms [40, 11, 23] , named after their three inventors, are the fundamental technique in mechanism design for inducing truthful behaviour of strategic agents. Nisan and Ronen [30, 31] were the first to consider the computational issues associated with the VCG technique. In particular, [30] defines the notion of VCG-Based mechanisms. VCG-based mechanisms have proven to be useful in designing approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions [17, 24] . In fact, the best known (deterministic) truthful approximation ratios for combinatorial auctions were obtained via VCG-based mechanisms [17, 24] (with the notable exception of an algorithm in [6] for the case that many duplicates of each item exist). Moreover, Lavi, Mu'alem and Nisan [26] have shown that in certain interesting cases VCG-based mechanisms are essentially the only truthful mechanisms (see also [20] ). Dobzinski and Nisan [16] tackled the problem of proving inapproximability results for VCG-based mechanisms by taking a communication complexity [42, 25] approach. Hence, in the settings considered in [16] , it is assumed that each bidder has an exponentially large string of preferences (in the number of items). However, real-life considerations render problematic the assumption that bidders' preferences are exponential in size. Our intractability results deal with bidder preferences that are succinctly described, and therefore relate to computational complexity. Thus, our techniques enable us to prove lower bounds even for the important case in which bidders' preferences can be concisely represented.
The connection between the VC dimension and VCG-based mechanisms was observed in [34] , where a general (i.e., not restricted to VCG-based mechanisms) inapproximability result was presented, albeit in the context of a different mechanism design problem, called combinatorial public projects (see also [38] ). The analysis in [34] was carried out within the standard VC framework, and so it relied on existing machinery (namely, the Sauer-Shelah Lemma [37, 39] and its probabilistic version due to Ajtai [2] ). To handle the unique technical challenges posed by combinatorial auctions (specifically, the fact that the universe of items is partitioned between the bidders) new machinery is required. Indeed, our technique can be interpreted as an extension of the Sauer-Shelah Lemma to the case of partitions in Sec. 4).
The VC framework has received much attention in past decades (see, e.g., [3, 7, 29] and references therein), and many generalizations of the VC dimension have been proposed and studied. To the best of our knowledge, none of these generalizations captures the case of n-tuples of disjoint subsets of a universe considered in this paper. In addition, no connection was previously made between the the VC dimension and the approximability of combinatorial auctions.
1.4 Organization of the Paper In Sec. 2, we formally define the problem and develop the necessary technical background. In Sec. 3 we present our first result for maximal-in-range mechanisms as described above. In Sec. 4 we present our second result, pertaining to randomized maximal-in-weighted-range mechanisms.
We conclude and present open questions in Sec. 5. An allocation of items M to the players N is a function S : M → N ∪ { * }. Notice that we do not require all items to be allocated. If an allocation S allocates all items -i.e. S maps M into N -we say S is a total allocation. The allocation that allocates no items is called the empty allocation. For convenience, we use S(j) to denote the player receiving item j, and we use S i to denote the items allocated to player i. We use X (M, N ) to denote the set of all alocations of M to N .
In combinatorial auctions, the feasible solutions are the allocations X ([m], [n]) of the items to the players. The social welfare of such an allocation S is defined as i v i (S i ). When the players have values {v i } i , we often use v(S) as shorthand for the welfare of S. The goal in combinatorial auctions is to find an allocation that maximizes the social welfare.
Valuation Classes
The hardness of designing truthful combinatorial auction mechanisms depends on the allowable player valuations. Recall that a valuation over M is a function v : 2 M → R + . We let V denote the set of all valuations over all abstract finite sets M . A valuation class C is a subset of V. Examples of valuation classes include submodular valuations, subadditive valuations, single-minded valuations, etc.
Our first hardness result pertains to deterministic mechanisms for a simple class: budget-additive valuations. This is despite the fact that the social welfare maximization problem admits an FPTAS when the number of bidders is constant [4] . Budget-additive valuations are defined as follows. Definition 2.1. We say a valuation v : 2 M → R + is budget-additive if there exists a constant B ≥ 0 (the budget) such that v(A) = min(B, i∈A v({i})).
Our second result applies to any valuation class that induces an APX-hard welfare maximization problem over two bidders, and moreover satisfies some natural properties.
Definition 2.2. We a say a valuation class C is regular if the following hold 1. Every valuation in C is monotone and normalized.
2. The canonical valuation on any singleton set is in C. Namely, for any item a the valuation v : 2 {a} → R + , defined as v({a}) = 1 and v(∅) = 0, is in C. 
Closed under scaling: Let
5. Closed under relabeling: Let M 1 , M 2 be sets with a bijection f :
Note that all regular valuation classes support zeroextension. More formally, let M ⊆ M ′ , and let v :
In the context of combinatorial auctions, we use C m to denote the subset of valuation class C that applies to items [m] .
Most well-studied valuation classes for which the underlying optimization problem is APX-hard are regular. This includes submodular, subadditive, coverage, and weighted-sum-of-matroid-rank valuations. However, in addition to budget-additive valuations, two interesting counter-examples come to mind: multi-unit (where items are indistinguishable), and single-minded valuations. Nevertheless, the underlying optimization problem is not APX hard for multi-unit valuations, and for single-minded valuations the computational hardness of approximation is n 1−ǫ even without the extra constraint of truthfulness (see [10] ).
Truthfulness
An n-bidder, m-item mechanism for combinatorial auctions with valuations in C is a pair (f, p) where
We say deterministic mechanism (f, p) is truthful if for all i, all v i , v ′ i and all v −i we have that
A randomized mechanism (f, p) is universally truthful if it is a probability distribution over truthful deterministic mechanisms. More generally, (f, p) is truthful in expectation if for all i, all v i , v We say an algorithm A for n-player combinatorial auctions achieves an α-approximation if, for every input n, m and v 1 , . . . , v n :
Moreover, we sayA achieves an α-approximation for m items if the above holds whenever the number of items is fixed at m.
MIR, Randomized MIR, MIDR, and
MIWR Maximal in range (MIR) algorithms were introduced in [32] as a paradigm for designing truthful approximation mechanisms for computationally hard problems. An algorithm A is maximal-in-range if it induces a maximal-in-range allocation rule when n and m are fixed.
A generalization of maximal-in-range that uses randomization sometimes yields better algorithms. An algorithm A is randomized maximal-in-range if it induces a maximal-in-range allocation rule for every realization of its random coins. It is well known that a randomized MIR algorithm can be combined with the VCG payment scheme to yield a universally truthful mechanism.
Dobzinski and Dughmi defined a generalization of randomized maximal-in-range algorithms in [15] , termed maximal-in-distributional-range (MIDR). Here, each element of the range is a distribution over allocations. The resulting mechanism outputs the distribution in the range that maximizes the expected welfare, and charges VCG payments. MIDR algorithms were used in [15] to obtain a polynomial-time, polynomial-communication, truthfulin-expectation FPTAS for multi-unit auctions, despite a lower bound of 2 on maximal-in-range algorithms that use polynomial communication. Moreover, they exhibited a variant of multi-unit auctions for which an MIDR FPTAS exists, yet no deterministic (or even universally truthful) polynomial time mechanism can attain an approximation ratio better than 2. Notably, the MIDR algorithms presented in [15] are of the following special form.
Definition 2.5. f is maximal in weighted range (MIWR) if f is MIDR, and moreover each distribution D in the range of f is a weighted allocation: There is a pure allocation S ∈ X ([m], [n]) such that D outputs S with some probability, and the empty allocation otherwise.
We denote a weighted allocation that outputs S with probabiliby w by the pair (w, S). When there is room for confusion, we use the term pure allocation to refer to an unweighted allocation.
Our second result will apply to all distributions over MIWR mechanisms, a class of mechanisms we term randomized maximal-in-weighted-range. Randomized MIWR mechanisms include all randomized MIR mechanisms as a special case.
An MIR algorithm achieving a min(n, 2m
1/2 ) approximation ratio Given valuation functions v i for each bidder i, first form a bipartite graph with nodes on one side representing items and nodes on the other representing bidders. Form edges with weight v i (j) between the nodes representing bidder i and item j. Proof. First, note that since there are n bidders, the maximum social welfare is at most n times the maximum welfare obtainable by any single bidder, V all . So this algorithm is at most an n approximation. We now proceed to show that this algorithm is also at most a 2 √ m approximation. Consider an assignment A which maximizes the social welfare. There are at most √ m bidders which get √ m or more of the items each. Call this set of bidders B high , and call the others B low .
If the bidders in B high get more than half of the social welfare, V all will be at least as great as the maximum value received by any bidder in B high . Thus, V all is at least 1/ √ m times the social welfare from bidders in B high . Because the bidders in B high get half the social welfare, the maximum social welfare is at most 2 √ m times V all in this case. In the other case, the bidders in B low get at least half the social welfare. Consider the matching in the bidder-and-item graph in which every bidder in B low receives the item maximizing v i (j) out of the items assigned to them in A. Since the valuations are subadditive and each bidder in B low receives at most √ m items, the total value of B low is at most √ m times the value of this matching. Since V matching is the maximal value over any matching, we see that the social welfare from B low is at most √ mV matching . Thus, since B low gets at least half the social welfare, the social welfare of A is at most 2 √ m times V matching . Since V all is always an n approximation and one of V all , V matching is a 2 √ m approximation of the social welfare, assigning items to achieve the max of these two welfares yields a min(n, 2 √ m) approximation.
A Primer on Non-Uniform Computation
Non-uniform computation is a standard notion from complexity theory (see e.g. [5] ). We say an algorithm is non-uniform if it takes in an extra parameter, often referred to as an advice string. However, the advice string is allowed to vary only with the size of the input (i.e. with m). Moreover, the length of the advice string can grow only polynomially in the size of the input. If a problem admits a non-uniform polynomial-time algorithm, this is equivalent to the existence of a family of polynomial-sized boolean circuits for the problem. When we say a non-uniform algorithm is polynomialtime MIR [MIWR], we mean that the algorithm runs in time polynomial in m, and maximizes over a [weighted] range, regardless of the advice string. When we say a non-uniform algorithm achieves an approximation ratio of α on m, we mean that there exists a choice of advice string for input length m such that the algorithm always outputs an α-approximate allocation.
Technical Assumptions For Second Result
For our second result, a note is in order on the representation of valuations. Our results hold in the computational model. Therefore, we may assume that valuation functions are succinct, in that they are given as part of the input, and can be evaluated in time polynomial in the length of their description. Naturally, this result applies to non-succint valuations with oracle access, when the resulting problem admits a suitable reduction from an APX-hard optimization problem. Moreoever, due to the generality of this result, we need to make some technical assumptions. Namely, we restrict our attention to combinatorial auctions over a "well-behaved" family of instances. This restriction is without loss of generality for all well-studied classes of valuations for which the problem is APX-hard, such as coverage, submodular, etc. A family I of inputs to combinatorial auctions is well-behaved if there exists a polynomial b(m) such that for each input (k, m, v 1 , . . . , v k ) ∈ I, the function v i is represented as a bit-string of length O(b(m)), and moreover always evaluates to a rational number represented using O(b(m)) bits. While we believe this assumption may be removed, we justify it on two grounds. First, every well-studied variant of combinatorial auctions that is APX-hard is also APX-hard on a well-behaved family of instances, so this restriction is without loss for all such variants. Second, this assumption greatly simplifies our proof, since it allows us to describe the size of an instance by a single parameter, namely m.
Hardness for MIR Mechanisms
In this section, we prove the following theorem: Theorem 3.1. Let M be a polynomial-time maximalin-range mechanism for auctions with n budget-additive bidders and m items, with n = n(m) ≤ m η for positive constant η < 1/2. If M approximates the social welfare with a ratio of n/(1 + ǫ) for positive constant ǫ, then N P ⊆ P/poly. Theorem 3.1 is a direct consequence of Lemmas 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 below. It also leads to the following theorem, which shows that it is not possible to find a polynomialtime maximal-in-range mechanism that achieves an approximation much better than the min(n, 2m
1/2 ) in [17] unless NP has polynomial circuits. Theorem 3.2. For any positive constant ǫ and n = n(m) ≤ poly(m), no polynomial-time maximal-in-range auction mechanism can approximate the social welfare with a ratio better than min(n, m 1/2−ǫ ) by a constant factor unless N P ⊆ P/poly.
Proof. This follows from Theorem 3.1 by simply noting that any mechanism M which performs well on n = n(m) ≤ m 1/2−ǫ bidders will perform well on n = n(m) ≤ poly(m) bidders when all but m 1/2−ǫ of the bidders have valuation functions which are identically zero. Thus, by setting all but m 1/2−ǫ of the valuation functions to 0, and simulating M, we are effectively simulating M on an auction with n = m 1/2−ǫ , as assigning items to bidders with valuations functions equal to zero has the same effect as not assigning them at all. Thus, setting n ′ = min(n, m 1/2−ǫ ), we see by Theorem 3.1 that achieving an approximation ratio better than n ′ implies N P ⊆ P/poly.
We begin the proof of Theorem 3.1 by examining the structure of the range. Below we omit floors and ceilings when dealing with them would be routine.
The Counting Argument
m . For a vector x ∈ R, x i = j means that item i is given to bidder j, while x i = ⋆ indicates that no bidder is given item i. For S ⊆ [m], we define R S to be the subset of the range where all of the items in S are assigned to bidders,
When considering R S we wish to focus on the bidders that the items in S are assigned to, so we define T S to be the projection of R S to the indices in S. So
|S| . In order to show that M can solve a hard problem, we will show that there is some T S with sufficiently many elements so that subset sum can be embedded in the valuations of S by the various bidders in such a way that M will solve it. By focusing on a portion of the range such that there are no unassigned items within a fixed subset S, we can ignore the difficulties associated with unassigned items. This idea allows for the use of standard VC machinery. First, we show that there must be some exponentially large T S . We begin with a helpful lemma.
Lemma 3.1. For any positive constant ǫ and any m, n for which the binomial coefficients below are positive,
So multiplying the ǫm/n terms together, we have
, which proves the lemma.
Lemma 3.2. Let M be a maximal-in-range mechanism for auctions with n bidders and m items that approximates the social welfare with a ratio of n/(1 + 2ǫ), for positive constant ǫ. Then there exists a set S ⊆ [m] with |S| = ǫm/n where T S has size |T S | ≥ (1 + ǫ) ǫm/n .
Proof. To begin, we associate with each x ∈ [n] m a set of valuation functions. The valuation functions are such that
m . Because M approximates the social welfare with a ratio of (1 + 2ǫ)/n and the maximum social welfare is m, there must be a member r ∈ R of the range such that r i = x i for at least ((1 + 2ǫ)/n)m different indices i. Let S x be the set of these indices,
There are at least
S x of size ǫm/n. For each such set S ′ , T S ′ contains the projection of x to S ′ . If T S ′ contains the projection of x to S ′ , we say that x is covered by T S ′ . If t ∈ T S ′ is the projection of x to S ′ , we say that t covers x. m . So C(S) < (1+ǫ) ǫm/n n m−ǫm/n , which gives the bound (3.2)
So by Equations 3.1 and 3.2, we have
which we simplify to
By Lemma 3.1, we get
which is simply n ǫm/n , contradicting (3.3). This proves that there exists some S ⊆ [m] with |S| = ǫm/n such that |T S | ≥ (1 + ǫ) ǫm/n .
Using the VC Dimension
At this point, we would like to use Sauer's lemma to show a large VC dimension. Unfortunately, it does not generalize well to auctions with three or more bidders because for n > 2 there exist sets of size (n − 1) m > 2 m with n-ary VC dimension equal to 0. To get around this difficulty, we map T S injectively from [n] ǫm/n into [2] ǫm , and show that the image of this map has a large VC dimension. The large VC dimension then permits the embedding of an NP-hard problem (see Section 3.3). In order to show a lower-bound on the VC dimension, we use Sauer's Lemma: Lemma 3.3. (Sauer's Lemma) Let S be a subset of [2] ℓ with |S| > k−1 i=0 ℓ i . The VC dimension of S is at least k.
We will make use of the following corollary:
Corollary 3.1. Let T be a subset of [2] ℓ . For any constant δ > 1/2 and any ǫ > 0, the following holds for all sufficiently large ℓ:
Proof. Since for sufficiently large ℓ, ℓ 1/2 < ℓ/2,
which is less than |T | = (1 + ǫ) ǫℓ δ for sufficiently large ℓ, since δ > 1/2.
Let φ i : n → {0, 1} be defined by
For any vector v, take φ i (v) to mean the application of φ i to each component of v. Similarly, if φ i is applied to a set of vectors, the result is that of applying φ i to each vector in that set. The next lemma is the main lemma in this section; it refers to the range R and the subsets T S defined in Section 3.1. with |S| = ǫm/n such that |T S | ≥ (1+ǫ) ǫm/n , then there exists a bidder i * such that φ i * (R) has VC dimension at least
Proof. Define vectors e j = (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0), where the single 1 is in position j, and the number of coordinates of e j is n. We define f :
ǫm by f (x) = e x1 e x2 · · · e x ǫm/n . We write f (T ) for a subset T to mean the set {f (t) : t ∈ T }.
The function f is injective, so
1−η . We are assuming that m is sufficiently large, so we can apply Corollary 3.1 (with δ = 1−η > 1/2 and ℓ = ǫm) to conclude that f (T S ) has VC dimension at least (ǫm) 1/2 . Let Q be a size (ǫm)
1/2 subset of [ǫm] that is shattered by f (T S ). Recall that each member of f (T S ) is the concatenation of vectors of length n, where a 1 in the ith position of the jth such vector corresponds to the ith bidder getting item j. In this way each element in Q corresponds to one of the n bidders. Partition Q into sets Q i , where Q i contains those coordinates that correspond to bidder i. There are n parts in the partition, so there is some i * ∈ [n] for which Q i * has size at least (ǫm) 1/2 /n. Since Q is shattered by f (T S ), so is the subset Q i * . This means exactly that φ i * (T S ) has VC dimension at least |Q i * | ≥ (ǫm) 1/2 /n. Since the members of T S are projections of members of R onto the coordinates in S, this implies that φ i * (R) also has VC dimension at least
For a more intuitive understanding of Lemma 3.4, consider viewing all bidders other than i * as a single meta-bidder. Lemma 3.4 states that there is a polynomially large set of items which are fully allocated in every possible way under this 2-bidder view.
Embedding Subset Sum
We now show that if φ i * (R) has VC dimension at least m γ for constant γ > 0, we can embed a subset sum instance into the auction in such a way that it is solved by M. We use a reduction similar to one used in [27] to show that exactly maximizing the social welfare of these auctions is NP-hard.
Lemma 3.5. Let M be a polynomial-time maximal-inrange mechanism for auctions with n bidders and m items. Suppose there exists a constant γ > 0 such that for all sufficiently large m, there exists a bidder i * such that φ i * (R) has VC dimension at least m γ (where R is the range). Then N P ⊆ P/poly.
Proof. We take as advice the set L ⊆ [m] of size m γ that is shattered by φ i * (R). For ease of exposition we re-order the items so that L is the set of the first m γ items. Let a 1 , . . . , a m γ be a subset sum instance with target sum K. For all bidders i = i * , we set
and for bidder i * , we set
If there is a subset V of {a 1 , . . . , a m γ } summing to K, there is an assignment in R with social welfare of j a j + K. This can be any assignment where bidder i * gets the items in V , and the other items are distributed among the other bidders. R must contain such an assignment because φ i * (R) shatters L. Since M is maximal-in-range with range R, it will output an assignment with at least this social welfare.
If there is no subset of {a 1 , . . . , a m γ } summing to K, M will assign bidder i * a subset V ⊆ M such that j∈V a j = K. If j∈V a j < K, the total value is at most
If j∈V a j > K, bidder i * gets value 2K. So the total value is at most
So every assignment has social welfare less than j a j + K. So taking L as advice, we can solve a subset sum instance with k integers in polynomial time (in m = k 1/γ and the size of the binary representations of the integers). Therefore, subset sum is in P/poly, so N P ⊆ P/poly.
Final Proof
We can now prove Theorem 3.1. We have a polynomial-time maximal-in-range mechanism M for auctions with n bidders and m items, with n = n(m) ≤ m η for positive constant η < 1/2. By Lemma 3.2, for each m there exists a subset S ⊆ [m] of size (ǫ/2)m/n such that |T S | ≥ (1 + ǫ/2) (ǫ/2)m/n . By Lemma 3.4, this implies that for sufficiently large m, the range of M has VC dimension at least ǫ/2 · m 1/2−η . Since η < 1/2, we have ǫ/2 · m 1/2−η ≥ m γ for some fixed positive constant γ and sufficiently large m. By Lemma 3.5, we thus have that N P ⊆ P/poly.
Super-polynomially many bidders
In this section, we observe that our results can be extended to handle the case of n super-polynomial in m, at the expense of a stronger complexity assumption. For n larger than m, our technique shows a limit of m 1/2−ǫ on the approximation ratio of any mechanism which runs in time polynomial in m. However, by our definition an efficient mechanism need only run in time polynomial in n and m, which is greater than poly(m) for super-polynomial n. By strengthening the complexity assumption, we can still prove limits on the achievable social welfare.
For instance, if n is sub-exponential in m, we can begin by assuming that N P does not have subexponential size circuits. Then applying the same reduction leads to a circuit family of size poly(n, m) (or sub-exponential in m), which solves subset sum instances of size m γ for constant γ > 0, and this implies that N P has subexponential size circuits.
If n is sufficiently large as a function of m, it can even become possible to maximize the social welfare exactly in polynomial time. Proof. If B m ∈ O(poly(n)), it is possible to enumerate all of the partitions of [m] into any number of disjoint subsets in polynomial time. For each such partition into sets S 1 , . . . , S k , form a bipartite graph where one side has nodes representing the sets S 1 , . . . , S k and the other has nodes representing the bidders. The edge between bidder i and partition S j has weight v i (S j ).
After finding a maximum weighted matching on each such bipartite graph, we can choose the maximum matching over all partitions. This matching represents the assignment which maximizes the social welfare. This can be easily seen because every assignment corresponds to a matching in the bipartite graph for some partition.
Hardness for Randomized MIWR Mechanisms
We find the proof in this section easier to follow when the approximation ratio is expressed by a number less than 1, and we will follow this practice henceforth. Thus, when we say that a randomized mechanism achieves an approximation ratio of β < 1, it means that for every input n, m and v 1 , . . . , v n :
v(S) .
In this section, we prove the following result.
Theorem 4.1. Fix a regular valuation class C for which 2-player social welfare maximization is AP Xhard. Fix a constant n ≥ 1. For any constant ǫ > 0, no polynomial-time randomized MIWR algorithm for nplayer combinatorial auctions achieves an approximation ratio of 1/n + ǫ, unless NP ⊆ P/Poly.
It is worth noting that this impossibility result applies to all universally-truthful randomized maximalin-range algorithms. First,we prove the analogous result for MIWR mechanisms that take polynomial advice. Theorem 4.2. Fix a regular valuation class C for which 2-player social welfare maximization is AP Xhard. Fix a constant n ≥ 1. For any constant ǫ > 0, no non-uniform polynomial-time MIWR algorithm for n-player combinatorial auctions achieves an approximation ratio of 1/n + ǫ, unless NP ⊆ P/Poly.
We then complete the proof by showing that any randomized MIWR mechanism can be "de-randomized" to one that takes polynomial advice.
Our proof strategy for Theorem 4.2 is as follows. In Section 4.2 we define a "perfect valuation profile" on n players as a set of valuations where exactly one player is interested in each item. We then show that any range of allocations that gives a good approximation on a randomly drawn perfect valuation profile must "shatter" a constant fraction of the items, meaning that the range contains all allocations of that subset of the items to q of the players, where the value of q depends on the quality of the approximation.
In Section 4.3, we prove Theorem 4.2 by induction on the number of players n. Roughly speaking, we show that for any MIWR mechanism A for n players, the allocations with weight much larger than 1/n + ǫ are useless. Namely, the inductive hypothesis implies that the allocations with weight sufficiently larger than 1/n+ǫ cannot yield a good approximation to a randomly drawn perfect valuation; otherwise, one could use the resulting shattered set of items to design a strictly better MIWR mechanism for n ′ players for some n ′ < n. This allows us to conclude that all "useful" allocations have very similar weight to one another -the weights are close within 1−η for arbitrarily small η and a sufficiently large set of items. Now that the mechanism maximizes over a large set of allocations that are almost "pure", in the sense that the weights are almost identical, this yields a PTAS, contradicting the APX-hardness of the problem.
Some complexity theory.
Before presenting the main body of the proof, we first develop some complexity theory tools to address a subtlety in the argument. Broadly speaking, our proof involves constructing a reduction that transforms every instance of a n-player mechanism design problem into an instance of one of n other problems P 1 , . . . , P n , each of which individually is presumed to be computationally hard. The reduction has the property that input instances with a given number of items, m, are all transformed into inputs of the same problem P i , but instances with a different number of items may map to a different one of the n problems. This raises difficulties because the complexity of P 1 , · · · , P n may be "wild": for each of them, there may be some input sizes (perhaps even infinitely many) that can be solved by a polynomial-sized Boolean circuit. In this section we develop the relevant complexitytheoretic tools to surmount this obstacle. We relegate the proofs of these results to Appendix B. Definition 4.1. A set S ⊆ N is said to be complexitydefying (CD) if there exists a family of polynomial-sized Boolean circuits {C n } n∈N such that for all n ∈ S, the circuit C n correctly decides 3sat on all instances of size n.
A set T ⊆ N is said to be polynomially complexitydefying (PCD) if there exists a complexity-defying set S and a polynomial function p(n) such that T is contained in n∈S [n, p(n)]. Here [a, b] denotes the set of all natural numbers x such that a ≤ x ≤ b. If a set U ⊆ N is not PCD, we say it is non-PCD. Lemma 4.1. A finite union of CD sets is CD, and a finite union of PCD sets is PCD.
Definition 4.2.
A decision problem or promise problem is said to have the padding property if for all n < m there is a reduction that transforms instances of size n to instances of size m, running in time poly(m) and mapping "yes" instances to "yes" instances and "no" instances to "no" instances. Similarly, an optimization problem is said to have the padding property if for all n < m there is a reduction that transforms instances of size n to instances of size m, running in time poly(m) and preserving the optimum value of the objective function.
Lemma 4.2.
Suppose that L is a decision problem or promise problem that has the padding property and is NP-hard under polynomial-time many-one reductions. Let T be any subset of N. If there is a polynomialsized circuit family that decides L correctly whenever the input size belongs to T , then T is PCD. 
Perfect Valuations and a strong shattering lemma
We define a perfect valuation profile as one where each item is desired by exactly one player. Perfect valuation profiles will prove useful in our proof, due to the fact that no "small" range can well-approximate social welfare for a randomly-drawn perfect valuation profile. Definition 4.3. Let N and M be a set of players and items, respectively. Let v i : 2 M → R + be the valuation of player i ∈ N . We say the valuation profile {v i } i∈N is a perfect valuation profile on N and M if there exists a total allocation S of M to N such that v i (j) = 1 if j ∈ S i , and v i (j) = 0 otherwise. In this case, we say that {v i } i∈N is the perfect valuation profile generated by S.
To use perfect valuations in the proof of Theorem 4.1, they must belong to the class of valuations considered in the theorem. Indeed, it follows immediately from definition 2.2 that any regular class of valuations contains all perfect valuations.
The key property of perfect valuations is that, if a range R of allocations achieves a "good" approximation for many perfect valuations, then R must include all allocations of a constant fraction of the items to some set of q players. The value of q depends on the approximation guaranteed by R, with a better approximation yielding a larger q. This is formalized by the following Lemma.
Lemma 4.4. Let U and V be finite sets with |U | = m, |V | = n, and R a set of functions from U to V ∪ { * }. Suppose that for a random f : U → V , with probability at least γ there is a g ∈ R such that g(x) differs from f (x) on at most 1 − q−1 n − ǫ m elements x ∈ U . Then there is a subset S ⊆ U of cardinality at least δm (where δ > 0 may depend on γ, ǫ, q, n) and a subset T ⊆ V of cardinality q, such that every function from S to T occurs as the restriction of some g ∈ R.
We note that this shattering lemma is more general than the Sauer-Shelah lemma, which can only be applied directly to two players. The notion of "shattering" among multiple players is key to the proof in Section 4.3.
If we interpret U as the set of items, V the set of players, f a perfect valuation profile, and R a range of allocations, then the implication of the lemma to our problem is immediate. The proof of the lemma is nontrivial, and we relegate it to Appendix A.
Hardness for Non-Uniform MIWR Mechanisms
In this section we prove Theorem 4.2. We fix the valuation class C as in the statement of the theorem. Moreover, we fix η > 0 such that the 2-player social welfare maximization problem is NP-hard to approximate within a factor of 1 − η. The proof proceeds by induction on n, the number of players. We need the following strong inductive hypothesis: IH(n): For any constant α > 1/n and set T ⊆ N, if a non-uniform polynomial-time MIWR algorithm for the n-player problem achieves an α-approximation for m items whenever m ∈ T , then T is PCD.
In other words, the set of input lengths for which any particular such algorithm may achieve an α-approximation is PCD. (See Section 4.1 for the definition of PCD.) If we can establish IH(n) for all n ≥ 1, then Theorem 4.2 follows, since N is not PCD. The base case of n = 1 is trivial. We now fix n, and assume IH(q) for all q < n.
Assume for a contradiction that IH(n) is violated for some α. Let α > 1/n be the supremum over all values of α violating it. Note that IH(n − 1)
To simplify the exposition, we assume the supremum is attained, and fix the algorithm A (and corresponding family of polynomial advice strings) achieving an α-approximation for all m ∈ F where F is not PCD. Our arguments can all be easily modified to hold when the supremum is not attained, by instantiating A to achieve (α − ζ) instead, where ζ > 0 is as small as needed for the forthcoming proof. The proof then proceeds as follows. We assign every m ∈ F to one or more subsets T q (2 ≤ q ≤ n + 1) in a way that is to be explained. We will prove that T q is PCD for all q, and hence by Lemma 4.1 their union F is PCD. This, however, contradicts our assumption that F is not PCD and completes the proof.
To prove that T q is PCD, we distinguish three cases depending on the value of q:
1. If 2 ≤ q ≤ n − 1, then we prove that m ∈ T q implies that there is a non-uniform polynomialtime MIWR mechanism for the q-player problem that achieves an approximation ratio strictly better than 1/q when the number of items is ⌈σm⌉, for some constant σ > 0. By our induction hypothesis, the set of all such ⌈σm⌉ must be a PCD set. By definition of PCD sets, this entails that T q is PCD.
2. If q = n, then we prove that for the n-player problem, whenever m ∈ T q , there is an efficient nonuniform MIWR mechanism that achieves approximation ratio strictly better than α for ⌈σm⌉ items. Once again this implies that the set of all such ⌈σm⌉ is a PCD set, by our hypothesis on α, which in turn implies that T n is PCD.
3. If q = n + 1 then we prove that when m ∈ T q there is a non-uniform polynomial-time algorithm achieving approximation ratio 1 − η for the two-player mitem social welfare maximization problem. (Recall that η was chosen so that this problem is NP-hard to approximate within 1 − η.) By Lemma 4.2, this implies T q is PCD.
We now implement this plan of proof in more detail.
Defining the partition of the range. Recall that an MIWR mechanism fixes a range of weighted allocations for each m. Let D m denote the range of A when the number of items is m.
m for some w} be the corresponding set of pure allocations. For each allocation S ∈ R m , we use w(S) to denote the weight of S in D m . (We assume without loss of generality that there is a unique choice of w(S), since allocations with greater weight are always preferred.) When m ∈ F, we may assume without loss of generality that w(S) ≥ α for every S ∈ R m , since A achieves an α-approximation for m. We fix ǫ > 0 such that α > 1/n + ǫ, and ξ > 0 such that 1/n + ǫ/2 = (1 − ξ) −1 · (1/n), and let δ = ǫη/5n. We partition R m into weight classes as follows:
• R m n = {S ∈ R m :
We are now ready to define T q 's. Roughly speaking, m ∈ T q if the output of A, when applied to a random perfect valuation profile, has probability at least 1/n of being in D 
However, by our assumption that A achieves an α-approximation for all valuation profiles with m ∈ F, the range D m must contain an α-approximation to the social welfare maximizer. If m ∈ F and v ∈ V m n+1 , therefore, it follows that D m n+1 must contain an α-approximation to the social welfare maximizer.
By the pigeonhole principle, at least one q satisfies
Finally, we define T q to be the set of all m ∈ F such that (4.5) holds. By the preceding discussion, we have
We now proceed to prove that T q is a PCD set for all q, completing the proof.
Claim 4.1. T q is a PCD set for all q ∈ {2, . . . , n + 1}. The result is a non-uniform poly-time MIWR mechanism for q players with approximation ratio bounded away from 1/q for all integersm = ⌈σm⌉ such that m ∈ T q . By our induction hypothesis IH(q), this implies that the set of all suchm is PCD. The fact that T q itself is a PCD set now follows as an easy application of the definition of PCD.
When q = n (Case 2 of our argument) using the same embedding yields an algorithm for n players that achieves an α/(1 − δ) approximation for allm = ⌈σm⌉ such that m ∈ T q . By our definition of α, this implies that the set of all suchm is a PCD set, which again implies that T q is a PCD set.
Case 3: The smallest weight class. The remaining case is q = n + 1. When m ∈ T n+1 , by our definition of V m n+1 , at least 1/n fraction of all (extended) perfect valuation profiles v ∈ V m have a weighted allocation (w(S), S) ∈ D m n+1 that is an α-approximation to the social welfare maximizing allocation for v. Since α ≤ w(S) < α/(1 − δ), the pure allocation S must be a (1 − δ)-approximation to the social welfare maximizer. On the other hand, our assumption is that maximizing social welfare is APX-hard, even for two players; specifically, recall that η > 0 was chosen such that it is NPhard to approximate the maximum social welfare within a factor of 1 − η. We complete the proof by exhibiting a randomized, non-uniform polynomial time algorithm that achieves a (1 − η)-approximation for the n-player problem with m/2 items, for all m ∈ T n+1 . Notice that the de-randomization argument of Adleman [1] for proving BPP ⊆ P/Poly can be used to de-randomize this to a non-uniform deterministic (1 − η)-approximation for the n-player problem with m/2 items, for all m ∈ T n+1 . The reader unfamiliar with Adleman's argument may refer to Section 4.4, where we use the argument to establish Theorem 4.1.
We will now use A to get a (1 − η)-approximate solution for an instance with n players and m ′ = m/2 items for all m ∈ T n+1 . We embed the instance on n players and m ′ items into A in the following way. Let 
We abuse notation and use v i [v 
2. The original valuation profile v accounts for a constant-factor share of v * in any optimal solution. Specifially OP T ≥ ǫ 4n (γOP T ′ ). This implies that an allocation that gives (1 − δ)-approximation to OP T * gives a (1 − O(δ))-approximation to OP T . To be more precise, it can be shown by a simple calculation that:
We are now ready to show that running A on the valuations v * will yield, with constant probability, an allocation that is a (1 − η)-approximation to the optimal welfare for the original valuations v, when m ∈ T n+1 . Let (w(S), S) be the weighted allocation output by A; note that S is a random variable over draws of v ′ . Since A is an α approximation algorithm, the welfare w(S)v * (S) is at least αOP T * ≥ (1/n + ǫ)OP T * with probability 1. This implies that v * (S) ≥ 
then for 2 ≤ q ≤ n, there is no S ∈ R m q that satisfies (4.6), and any such S satisfying (4.6) must belong to D m n+1 . Also, by our assumption that m ∈ T n+1 , the probability that
is at least 1/n. We have thus established that running A on the random input v * yields, with probability at least 1/n, an outcome (w(S), S) in D m n+1 . Using the fact that w ≤ α/(1 − δ) and w(S)v * (S) ≥ αOP T , we conclude that S is (1−δ)-approximate for v * also with probability 1/2:
Invoking Claim 4.3, we conclude that v(S) ≥ (1 − η)OP T with constant probability over draws of v ′ . Since w(S) is at least 1/n, S is output by A with constant probability. This completes the proof.
De-Randomizing Theorem 4.1
In this section, we complete the proof of Theorem 4.1. First, we make the observation that running a randomized MIWR algorithm multiple times independently and returning the best allocation output by any of the runs results in another randomized MIWR algorithm.
Lemma 4.5. Fix a randomized MIWR algorithm A and a positive integer r. Let A r be the algorithm that runs r independent executions of A on its input, and of the r allocations returned, outputs the one with greatest welfare. A r is also randomized MIWR.
Proof. Condition on D 1 , . . . , D r , the ranges of A on the r independent executions. A maximizes expected welfare over D i on execution i. Therefore A r maximizes over
Now, we derive Theorem 4.1 from Theorem 4.2, using a de-randomization argument similar to that of Adleman [1] . Assume for a contradiction that A is a randomized MIWR algorithm that runs in polynomial time and achieves an approximation ratio 1/n + ǫ for each input m and v 1 , . . . , v n . Let ℓ denote the number of bits in the input, and let s(ℓ) be a polynomial bounding the length of the random string drawn by A. We will describe a polynomial-time with polynomial-advice MIWR algorithm that achieves an approximation ratio of 1/n + ǫ/2, which contradicts Theorem 4.2.
Let r(ℓ) = 2ℓ/ǫ 2 and let A ′ = A r(ℓ) . By Lemma 4.5, A ′ is randomized MIWR, runs in polynomial time, and draws at most s(ℓ)r(ℓ) random bits. Let X i be the fraction of the optimal social welfare achieved by the allocation output on the i'th run of A. The random variables X 1 , . . . , X r(ℓ) are independent, 0 ≤ X i ≤ 1, and E[X i ] ≥ 1/n + ǫ. For each input of length ℓ, the probability that none of the r(ℓ) runs of A return an allocation with welfare better than 1/n + ǫ/2 of the optimal can be bounded from above using Hoeffding's inequality:
The number of different inputs of length ℓ is 2 ℓ . Thus, using the union bound and the above inequality, the probability that A outputs a (1/n + ǫ/2)-approximate allocation on all inputs of length ℓ is nonzero. Therefore, for each ℓ there is choice of at most s(ℓ)r(ℓ) random bits such that A ′ achieves a 1/n + ǫ/2 approximation for all inputs. Using this as the advice string, this contradicts Theorem 4.2, completing the proof of Theorem 4.1.
Conclusions
We have shown that no polynomial-time maximal-inrange auction mechanism can approximate the social welfare to a ratio better than min(n, m 1/2−ǫ ) by a constant factor. This essentially resolves the maximum social welfare achievable by efficient maximal-inrange auction mechanisms for any class of valuations including the valuation functions we considered, as a min(n, 2m 1/2 ) ratio is achievable. There is an asymmetry as to the strength of the n and m 1/2−ǫ bounds, however, as the n bound eliminates the possibility of a ratio of n/(1 + ǫ) being achieved, but the m 1/2−ǫ bound leaves open the possibility of achieving an m 1/2−o(1) approximation. For super-polynomial n, we have demonstrated similar limits under stronger complexity assumptions, up to n being sub-exponential in m. We also showed that for sufficiently large n, a polynomial-time maximalin-range auction mechanism exists.
Generalizing to randomized maximal-in-weightedrange mechanisms, we showed that it is impossible to achieve an approximation ratio better than n for any fixed n. In order to achieve these results, we developed new machinery for the study of the VC dimension of partitions. This new machinery allows for the application of a useful generalization of the standard VC dimension, and is therefore of independent interest. While this largely resolves the performance of maximal-in-range and maximal-in-weighted-range mechanisms, it leaves open the performance of maximalin-distributional-range mechanisms, as well as the larger question of how well truthful mechanisms perform.
in S to its associated range is a restriction of an element in R. In the context of combinatorial auctions, we see U as the set of items, and V as the set of bidders, plus a dummy bidder representing not allocating the item. Then set of functions V U is the set of all possible allocations.
The following observation bridges this notion of shattering to its application to the combinatorial auctions in the paper. The observation is easily seen by the pigeonhole principle. Note that by the definition of (L, q)-shattering, if |L ′ | = q, then we have that every function from S ′ to L ′ is a restriction of an element in R. In the context of combinatorial auctions, this means that all possible allocations of items in S ′ to the q bidders in L ′ are in the range R under restriction. It is this form of "strong" shattering that is in use in the main body of the paper. In the following lemmas, we will show the existence of large (L, q)-shattered sets, being aware that an application of the above observation implies a subset being "strongly" shattered, of size only a constant factor smaller.
Lemma A.1. For all integers n ≥ q ≥ 2, and every real number ǫ > 0, there is a δ > 0 such that the following holds. For every pair of finite sets M, N with |N | = n and every set R of more than (q − 1 + ǫ) |M| elements of N M , there is a set S of at least δ|M | elements of M such that S is (V, q)-shattered by R.
Proof. Let F q (m, n, d) denote the maximum cardinality of a set R ⊆ A B such that |A| = n, |B| = m, and R does not (A, q)-shatter any (d + 1)-element subset of B.
Fix an element b ∈ B. For each element f ∈ R, let f −b denote the restriction of f to the set B\{b}. Take the set of all functions g : B\{b} → A and partition it into sets Q 0 , Q 1 , · · · , Q ( n q ) as follows. First, given an ordered pair (g, a) consisting of a function g from B\{b} to A and an element a ∈ A, let g * a denote the unique function f from B to A that maps b to a and restricts to g on B\{b}. Now define S(g) to be the set of all a ∈ A such that g * a is in R. Number all the q-element subsets of A from 1 to n q , call them P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P ( n q ) , and let Q i (1 ≤ i ≤ n q ) consist of all g such that S(g) has at least q elements, and the q smallest elements of S(g) constitute P i . Finally let Q 0 consist of all g such that S(g) has fewer than q elements. a polynomial-sized circuit that correctly decides 3sat instances of size n, as follows. First, we take the given 3sat instance and apply the reduction from the preceding paragraph to transform it into an L instance of size at most p(n). Then, letting m be any element of T ∩ {p(n) + 1, . . . , p(n + 1)}, we apply the padding reduction to transform this L instance into another L instance of size m. Finally, we solve this instance using a circuit of size poly(m) that correctly decides L on all instances of size m; such a circuit exists by our assumption on T .
For every m ∈ T there is an n ∈ N such that p(n) < m ≤ p(n + 1), and this n belongs to S. Thus, T ⊆ n∈S [n, p(n+1)], and this confirms that T is PCD. for some complexity-defying set S and polynomial function p(n). We may assume without loss of generality that p(n) is an increasing function of n and that p(n) ≥ n for all n. Suppose that {C n } is a polynomial-sized circuit family that correctly decides 3sat whenever the input size is in S. We will construct a polynomial-sized circuit family that correctly decides 3sat on all inputs. The construction is as follows: given an input size m, using (B.2) we may find a natural number n such that n ≤ p(m) ≤ p(n). Since p is an increasing function, we know that n ≥ m. Given an instance of 3sat of size m, we first adjoin irrelevant clauses that don't affect its satisfiability -e.g. the clause (x ∨ x) -until the input size is increased to n. This transformation can be done by a circuit of size poly(m), since n ≤ p(m). Then we solve the new 3sat instance using the circuit C n . By our assumption on S, this correctly decides the original 3sat instance of size m. As m was arbitrary, this establishes that NP ⊆ P/ poly, as desired.
